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Abstract
Though the link between technological system
architectures and buyer-supplier relationships has been
actively studied, no comprehensive framework
connecting system structures and component
purchasing categories exists. We examine the
technological dependency structures of such systems by
adopting the buyer’s viewpoint as system assembler and
integrator. We articulate how system dependencies
relate to switching costs and needs for investments and
technological expertise in buyer-supplier relationships.
By examining the extents and directions of indirect and
direct dependencies at the technological systems level,
we are able to identify the purchasing category to which
each component is most likely to belong. We
demonstrate our theoretical framework using an
empirical example of a technological system from the
energy industry.

1. Introduction
Successful organizations effectively manage,
access, and use both internal and external resources.
Supplier relationships are key to external resources, and
when relationship quality is high, both buyer and
supplier benefit from increased overall competitiveness.
Organizations are open systems that depend on events
in the external environment [1]; that is, they do not act
independently. Relationships range from close and
intense to distant. But how are the linkages between
resources and buyer-supplier relationships studied?
Traditionally, researchers have addressed this question
by defining components’ modularity levels and
examining the related buyer-supplier relationships.
However, modularity alone is insufficient to explain
buyer-supplier relationship characteristics. Previous
approaches have found both conflicting and supporting
results concerning the effects of product architectures on
inter-organizational relationships [2][3][4]. However,
the ways in which technological system architectures
and inter-organizational relationships interact remain
unknown[5].
The present study structures supplier-buyer
relationships using the purchasing portfolio approach
[6]. Purchasing portfolio categorization involves
statements
about
buyer-supplier
relationship
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characteristics, even when this relationship is connected
to a purchased component. Supply risk and profit impact
are the classifying dimensions [7]. Portfolio approaches
have often been criticized for their lack of patterns for
operationalizing dimensions and of fine-grained or
widely tested criteria to assign items like components
and products to categories [7][8]. In addition, product
interdependencies are not monitored [9]. Researchers
and practitioners leverage nebulous concepts like supply
risk and profit impact, even when these concepts are
defined by subjective decision making rather than
operationalized
measures
[10][9].
Systems’
technological structures are neglected in purchasing
portfolio research (with a few exceptions [9][11]),
though they are discussed elsewhere in supply chain
literature. However, both the product purchased and its
technology have been shown to significantly impact the
buyer-supplier relationship [12].
In this paper, we develop new measures to allocate
components to purchasing categories by leveraging
systems’ indirect and direct technological dependencies.
The broader question concerning the link between
system architectures and buyer-supplier relationships is
narrowed to the purchasing context. We use purchasing
portfolio categories [6][13] as anchors for our
theoretical framework development. In addition, we
limit the buyer’s role to that of an assembler and system
integrator that sources components from suppliers.
In this research, switching costs, buyer/supplier
investments, and the need for technological expertise
are understood as dependence dimensions that influence
the buyer-supplier relationship [14]. We use indirect and
direct technological dependencies to characterize how
systems’ technological structures affect switching costs,
buyer/supplier investments, the need for technological
expertise and, ultimately, the buyer-supplier
relationship. We leverage Kraljic’s matrix of purchasing
categories, which already includes switching costs,
investments, and the need for technological expertise
[14][13]. Our research objective is to connect system
architectures and buyer-supplier relationships in the
purchasing context. Thus, we propose a theoretical
framework that links system architectures with
purchasing portfolio categories from the buyer’s
perspective. Our theory contributes to the strategic
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purchasing literature on the characteristics of
purchasing categories and buyer-seller dependencies.
Assessments of purchasing portfolio component
categories have traditionally been subjective; however,
this paper offers system architecture-based metrics with
direct practical benefits for purchasing professionals.
We leverage objective measures to analyze component
dependencies in technological systems [2], [5], allowing
managers to better manage dependencies using our
component-categorizing framework. We demonstrate
the use of these metrics and the framework through the
hypothetical example of a technological system from the
energy industry.

2. Supply chain dependency patterns
2.1 Dependency patterns in supply chains
In this research, firms are seen as open systems that
depend on events in their external environments [1]. A
firm does not control all the resources necessary to
operate independently; thus, it must interact with its
environment to survive [1]. Hence, firms are constrained
by networks of interdependencies with other
organizations [15]. Dependency patterns form situations
in which continuous success is uncertain, especially
when a firm does not know which actors’ actions are
interdependent [15]. These patterns affect interorganizational power, which influences firms’
behaviors [15].
Three main factors affect buyer-supplier
dependence: resource importance, resource alternatives,
and buyer’s freedom in deciding resource-related issues
[16]. Activities can be similar across supply chains,
creating pooling interdependencies among firms [17].
We expect a buyer’s authority over a resource to be
insignificant when pooling dependencies are high.
When separate supply chains leverage the same
resource, the resource supplier can reach economies of
scale by fitting the resource into different production
contexts. This may cause reciprocal supply chain
interdependencies, such that firms from different chains
interact to adjust resources and separate production
contexts [17]. Our theory leverages these concepts of
pooling and reciprocal dependency, since they may help
clarify when a buyer is more or less likely to have
authority over resources.
2.2 Purchasing portfolio approach
Purchasing
portfolios
enable
professional
purchasers to differentiate among suppliers and choose
the most effective strategy for each relation [11]. Unless
the resources for building and maintaining partnerships
are unlimited, different types of relationships are needed

for different purchases. Partnerships are expensive to
develop and maintain [12], so it is important to build
numerous coordination mechanisms instead of
optimizing only one level of supplier integration [18]. In
this paper, we do not discuss these coordination
mechanisms but how to divide the components of the
purchasing portfolio categories.
Kraljic’s matrix (1983) (and modifications)
represents one of the most widely accepted portfolio
approaches in research and practice [11][13][19].
Kraljic’s original work sought to minimize supply risk
and maximize firms’ buying power. The matrix starts by
defining supply risks and profit impact, which are two
dimensions needed to build the categories. Both
variables can have either “low” or “high” values,
resulting in a 2x2 matrix with four quadrants:
noncritical, leverage, bottleneck, and strategic [6].
These quadrants are linked to different kinds of
relationships and purchasing strategies. Kraljic’s second
matrix addresses the strategic category, which has since
been complemented by other scholars [12][9][20]. This
research builds on a descriptive modification of
Kraljic’s matrix (shown in Figure 1). This modification
focuses not on the normative patterns of what a firm
should do, but on the characteristics of the buyersupplier relationship.
Strategic components are typically purchased from a
single supplier and have high supply risk and profit
impact. Single-source purchasing involves significant
risks, which a buyer may attempt to reduce by building
supplier partnerships. Strategic items do not usually lead
to fierce price negotiations, but a buyer may accept
higher prices if a component has a significant profit
impact. If a firm seeks to reduce its long-term supplier
dependence risk, it may consider backward integrating
to achieve in-house production. This purchasing
strategy seeks to develop long-term, close, and
collaborative relations with strategic component
suppliers, which can be seen as extensions of the buying
firm. Total dependence is at its highest level. Since both
buyer and supplier are heavily involved in the
partnership, a balance of power is assumed [21];
however, supplier dominance has also been reported
[14][13].
Bottleneck components have low profit impact and
high supply risk. These components require continuous
supply, even at additional costs. With these components,
suppliers have the dominant power position, and total
interdependence is moderate, but higher than in
noncritical item relationships [13]. Neither buyers nor
suppliers are heavily involved in the relationship if
compared to strategic category. Long-term contracts,
contingency planning and single sourcing purchasing
practices are used to secure continuous supply. Buyers
seek to adapt to their dependence, reduce the negative
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consequences of the unfavorable situation, or try to find
other solutions [14].

Strategic
Balanced power
High level of
interdependence

Non-critical
Balanced power
Low level of
interdependence

Bottleneck
Supplier dominated
Moderate level of
interdependence

Profit impact

Leverage
Buyer dominated
Moderate level of
interdependence

Supply risk

Figure 1. Categories, dimensions, and power and
dependence in the purchasing portfolio matrix [14]
[13] [21]
Leverage items are associated with high profit
impact but low supply risk. These items can be obtained
from various suppliers, giving buyers the dominant
negotiating position. There is no need for long-term
supply contracts; instead, buyers arrange competitive
bidding among suppliers. Leverage items contribute
heavily to end product cost, so aggressively maximizing
buying power may be reasonable. Suppliers’
dependence is high, while buyers’ dependence is low.
Total interdependence is higher than for non-critical
items, but lower than for strategic items [13].
Non-critical items have low profit impact and low
supply risk. Buyers have many alternative suppliers, and
vice versa. Neither supplier nor buyer is tied to the other;
thus, there is a balance of power and a low level of
interdependence [13]. Since non-critical items require
significant purchasing time but represent only modest
profit impact, transactions are characterized by routines
and pooled purchasing requirements. Efficient
processing and reductions to logistic and administrative
complexity are the preferred purchasing approaches.
We argue that the matrix shown in Figure 1 does not
fully capture the determinants of the buyer-supplier
relationship. In particular, it does not recognize
component dependencies that impact buyer-supplier
relationships. In the following sections, we explore the
little-researched topic of how these technological
system dependencies affect the relationship.

3. Network view of system architecture
3.1 System architecture and modularity

A product architecture defines the product’s
functions and how these functions are mapped to
physical components. Second, it specifies the
component interfaces [22]. Here we use a similar
concept of technological system architecture that
extends the product architecture by describing an entire
system.
Technological
dependencies
between
components are part of architecture as well as interfaces.
We do not examine single interfaces per se, but, rather,
explore technological dependencies at the system level.
Modularity in product design enables the creation of
high levels of component design independence [23]. For
instance, standardizing component interfaces increases
modularity. These standardized interfaces define
components’ functional, spatial, and similar relations.
Modular products help firms manage outsourcing and
external manufacturing, since product modularity
decreases the need for (technical) coordination. By
contrast, integral architecture exists when one-to-one
mapping between components and product functions is
not possible and component interfaces are highly
interdependent [22]. The body of modularity research
relies on divisions among modular-integral product
architectures. This perspective successfully captures
design extremes; but it does not fully acknowledge the
components’ intermediate forms of interdependence. In
particular, the concept of modularity does not consider
the direction or amount of direct or indirect component
technological dependence.
When a buyer cannot find suitable components
among a supplier’s existing component specifications, it
may need customized components. Customization is the
extent to which a product is customized for a buyer.
Suppliers can serve multiple buyers through
customization [24]; however, this may be challenging,
since customization often requires non-transferable
buyer-specific investments. The emergence of dominant
designs may ease these challenges. Dominant designs
help industries transition from customized, made-toorder products to standardized, mass-manufacturing
systems. Dominant designs emerge when a market
accepts a particular product design as the standard for
the whole product category [25]. Dominant designs can
be viewed as continuum, such that the majority of
designs in the industry matter. Usually, dominant
designs focus on core components, and individual
changes cause system-level malfunctions [25].
Product modules cannot be coordinated solely
through standardized interface specifications, since
functional dependency structures (e.g. heat transfer,
magnetic fields, etc.) that demand coordination remain.
This is why modular system design is positively linked
to supplier involvement: Firms must work more closely
to ensure the compatibility of the modular subsystems.
Significant changes in system architectures present
challenges for the firms involved. Changes in system
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architectures may require shifts in industry structures,
such as firm boundaries [26] [27]. If a modular
architecture change to an integral architecture [26],
reduced compatibility may prevent potential relations
with certain suppliers in industry. System architecture
decisions influence formal and informal organizational
structures; thus, knowledge of system architecture
improves our understanding of both technological and
organizational aspects [2][27].

change the component. Decisions made at higher levels
of the hierarchy influence lower levels [29], but
decisions made at lower levels may not cause influence
higher levels. From an engineering perspective,
component cyclicality and hierarchy are challenges for
inter-organizational teams seeking to develop fullsystem subsystems. If component cyclicality and
hierarchy are not considered, substantial design
problems may occur.

3.2 Buyer and supplier dependence from a technological
system perspective

Table 1. Buyer dependence from a technological
system perspective.
Buyer dependence

This chapter discusses the dimensions of buyersupplier dependence in the context of this paper. From a
technological perspective, buyer dependence on
suppliers has multiple dimensions, traditionally
understood as switching costs. Switching costs occur
when a buyer moves from one supplier to another [28].
Switching costs are often discussed as “umbrella”
constructs that include other costs. We do not follow this
conceptualization; instead, we use the term “switching
costs” to describe a buyer’s engineering costs when
switching suppliers. Overall, we discuss three
dimensions of a buyer’s dependence on a supplier:
switching costs, the buyer’s need for the supplier’s
technological expertise, and the buyer’s investments
[13][28].
Supplier dependence is measured using the same
dimensions as buyer dependence: switching costs,
supplier investments, and the supplier’s need for the
buyer’s technological expertise [13][28]. These are
summarized in Table 1. Table 2. show both the
dimensions of dependence and how these dependencies
can be understood from a technological system
perspective.
Switching component suppliers may require varying
amounts of buyer-side engineering activities. Even
small system changes may require adjustments
elsewhere; however, this depends on a component’s
indirect and direct influences on the overall system.
Thus, the extent of engineering—and, thus, a buyer’s
switching costs—depend on a component’s cyclicality
and hierarchical location in the system. A component is
called an in-cycle component [5] if it is part of the cycle
structure, in which a set of components form a set of
interdependency paths. A decision to change an in-cycle
component may force changes in other cycle
components, which may force other changes until global
constraints are satisfied. Long cycles with complex
dependency paths lead to quality defects, greater
coordination needs, cost overruns, and delays in product
development [5]. These cyclical structures may trigger
more changes if they are located at the top of the system
hierarchy. The higher the position of a component in the
hierarchy, the more system-level changes are needed to

Switching costs
Buyer investments

Need for supplier
technological
expertise

Buyer dependence from a
technological system perspective
Amount of engineering needed by
buyer when switching suppliers
Need to adapt to supplier’s
component (or product) through
specific investments
Supplier is providing technological
expertise (design/manufacturing)
needed by buyer

Buyer investments (e.g. in manufacturing facilities,
personnel training, and tooling) enable purchases from
specific suppliers. To match these purchased
components, specific processes are customized [12],
which may cause changes elsewhere in the system. The
final form of buyer dependence is the buyer’s need for
the supplier’s technological expertise in areas beyond
the buyer’s knowledge (e.g. expertise in efficient
manufacturing or technological expertise).
From a technological perspective (Table 2.), a
supplier’s dimensions of dependence are the same as a
buyer’s. Supplier switching costs are engineering costs
related to a supplier switching a buyer to another.
Supplier investments describe investments made for a
specific buyer (e.g. investments in manufacturing
facilities, dies, and personnel training) [12]. Depending
on the component purchased, suppliers may need
buyers’ critical expertise or specialized knowledge [14].
Buyers can provide component specifications and
guidance on component integration. We assume that the
need for a buyer’s technological expertise is higher
when a component is dedicated to and customized for a
buyer’s specific system.
Table 2. Supplier dependence from a technological
system perspective.
Supplier dependence

Switching costs

Supplier dependence from a
technological system
perspective
Amount of engineering needed
by a supplier when switching
buyers

5071

Supplier investments

Need for buyer’s
technological expertise

Need to adapt to a buyer’s
system with specific
investments
Buyer’s provision of
technological expertise critical
to the supplier’s component

Switching costs and supplier investments have
partly overlapping dependencies, since, if serving a
particular buyer demands specific investments, so will
changing buyers. Though component engineering and
supplier investments can be closely related in theory, we
separate these dependencies here, since, in empirical
settings, they may vary independently.

4.
Buyer-supplier
relationship
technological dependencies

and

other supply chains. Thus, the buyer’s authority over
these components is less significant than in purchasing
categories that lack pooling and reciprocal
interdependencies. When a component’s outbound
dependence is high, the component significantly
impacts other components. Here, a buyer must adapt its
system for compatibility, which may require buyer
investments and increase switching costs.
Leverage components. When a component has high
inbound and low outbound dependence, it must adapt to
other components. If this kind of component is
outsourced, the buyer must provide a detailed
description of the kind of component needed [11] to
ensure system compatibility. Thus, the supplier requires
the buyer’s technological expertise.

This chapter connect system architecture
characteristics to purchasing categories in our
theoretical framework. A component purchased by a
buyer has a technological dependency structure that is
clarified by the concepts of outbound and inbound
dependence. Outbound dependence indicates the extent
of components that might be affected by a change to the
focal component. Inbound dependence indicates the
components that might affect the focal component if
they change. Hence, inbound dependence indicates the
extent to which a component’s design depends on other
components, while outbound dependence measures the
extent to which a component affects the design of other
components.
Figure 2. presents a theoretical framework that
connects inbound and outbound dependencies with four
purchasing
categories:
leverage,
non-critical,
bottleneck, and strategic. Previous research has already
connected buyer-supplier dependencies to purchasing
categories [13][21], and we follow this work by naming
the categories similarly. Whereas previous work has
used axes of profit impact and supply risk [13], we use
inbound and outbound dependence. Our theoretical
framework contains three dimensions: switching costs,
buyer or supplier investments, and the need for another
party’s technological expertise.
We argue that, when a component’s inbound
dependence is high, supplier customization increases.
By contrast, when inbound dependence is low, a
component’s adaptation to the system is low, and the
supplier can design its component flexibly, without
strict buyer requirements. Further, if inbound
dependence is low, we argue that pooling
interdependencies and reciprocal interdependencies
[17] are more likely to exist, since the component can
more easily fit other technological systems and, thus,

Inbound dependency

4.1. Connecting technological dependency structures to
purchasing categories

Leverage
-Buyer dominated
-Buyer switching cost and
investments are low
-Buyer need of supplier
technological expertise is low
-Supplier switching costs and
investments are high
-Supplier need buyer’s
technological expertise

Strategic
-Balanced power
-Both supplier and buyer make
investments
-Both supplier and buyer have
high switching costs
-Both supplier and buyer need
technological expertise of
another party

Non-critical
-Balanced power
-Both supplier and buyer have
low switching costs
-No spesific buyer or supplier
investments
-Buyer need supplier’s
technological expertise (but not
vice versa)

Bottleneck
-Supplier dominated
-Buyer has high switching costs
and investments
-Buyer need supplier’s
technological expertise
-Supplier switching costs and
investments are low
-Supplier do not need buyer’s
technological expertise

Outbound dependency

Figure 2. Theoretical framework for connecting
technological dependencies of a component and a
purchasing category.
Suppliers must adapt their production systems to
produce these components, leading to buyer-specific
investments and dependence that grow over time,
especially if the investments are not transferable to other
buyers. By contrast, the buyer typically does not depend
heavily on the supplier’s technological expertise, since
the buyer provides detailed specifications of the
required component.
This lower buyer dependence manifests as buyer
dominance during buyer-supplier negotiations for
components with high inbound and low outbound
levels. Due to their low outbound level, these
components do not affect other system components;
thus, investment costs remain low, since the supplier can
be changed and the component delivered without
considerable engineering work. Switching costs,
however, are considerable, since buyers must train new
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suppliers in their technological requirements. This is the
main difference between the leverage category and the
non-critical category. Still, this buyer dependence is not
as significant as the supplier’s dependence on the buyer.
Non-critical components. When a component has
low outbound and inbound values, the technological
dependency of the entire system is low. These
components are not sources of technological
dependency paths because they are independent from
other components. If this kind of component is
outsourced, buyers’ component-system coordination
costs are low, and suppliers have more freedom to
design components suitable for multiple buyers. This
may lead to interdependence pooling [17], in which
different supply chains exploit the same component.
Buyers’ and suppliers’ switching costs remain low,
since relationship-specific investments are not
necessary. Buyers can be more or less dependent on
suppliers’ technological expertise and/or provide more
or less of their own specifications [11]. However, since
inbound dependence is low, suppliers do not require
buyers’ specifications the way they do for leverage
components. Since outbound dependence is also low,
switching suppliers is not challenging for buyers.
Therefore, components with low outbound dependence
differ from bottleneck items in that power is balanced
between buyer and supplier and overall interdependency
remains low.
Bottleneck components. When a component has low
inbound and high outbound values, it has a high position
in the technological hierarchy. This means that other
components adapt to its features, and it is not heavily
influenced by changes made elsewhere in the system. If
this kind of component is outsourced, the supplier is
likely to have the technological expertise necessary to
design the component’s specifications and deliver the
product [11]. Since the component has high outbound
dependency, the buyer must adapt its overall system to
the component; however, since inbound dependency is
low, the supplier has no need to significantly adapt the
component to the buyer’s system. From a technological
perspective, the supplier is unlikely to make buyerspecific investments. The technological system
dependencies create a situation in which the adaptation
of bottleneck components to other components is not
technologically meaningful. These components also
have pooling interdependencies [17] stemming from
their low inbound dependency, since the supplier has the
opportunity to leverage economies of scale in
manufacturing. Reciprocal interdependencies [17] may
also exist, since multiple buyers from separate supply
chains may try to influence suppliers to secure
component compatibility with their own systems;
however, this purchasing category is likely to be
dominated by the supplier.

If available suppliers provide diverse versions of the
same component, buyers must choose which component
to target and then adapt their systems for compatibility.
Here, suppliers may have power over buyers: If other
suppliers provide incompatible components that require
significant buyer re-engineering, switching costs will be
substantial. From a buyer’s engineering perspective,
switching may be challenging, since these components
have long dependency paths and require extensive
engineering work. However, since suppliers do not
adapt to particular buyers (low inbound dependence),
they face no technological constraints related to
switching buyers.
Strategic components. If a component has high
outbound and inbound dependencies, it has a high
position in the technological hierarchy. Still, there are
other components that influence the emergence of
system changes. These components adapt to the system,
and, simultaneously, the system adapts to them.
Suppliers cannot easily switch to other buyers due to the
specific investments required by their high inbound
dependency; that is, suppliers must do engineering work
to adapt their components to buyers’ systems, thus
raising switching costs.
However, buyers also face high investments,
switching costs, and engineering costs caused by high
outbound dependence. Both buyer and supplier are
likely to need the other’s technological expertise:
Suppliers need buyers’ component specifications to
ensure compatibility, and buyers need suppliers’ design
and/or manufacturing expertise [11].
Strategic components are critical because their high
outbound and inbound values make them specific to
certain system configurations. Compatibility with other
configurations is limited. Supplier and buyer are likely
to mutually agree on a component design dedicated to
the buyer’s system. The supplier has no alternative
buyers for the strategic component, and the buyer has no
alternative suppliers (at least not without substantial
costs). Thus, a component with high outbound and
inbound levels, is likely to create a buyer-supplier power
balance, since the partners’ high interdependencies limit
opportunities for switching.
4.2. Measuring direct and indirect technological
dependencies
In this chapter, we define metrics for outbound and
inbound dependencies. Direct technological system
dependencies can be measured using the Design
Structure Matrix (DSM), which maps the dependencies
of each component. This captures the degree to which a
change in any single element directly changes other
elements. Although DSMs have significant practical
implications for engineers, these presentations of direct
dependencies are not sufficient indicators of system
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architecture per se [30]. The system can only be
accurately described if (as in this paper) indirect
dependencies are added to the analysis. Both the number
of direct dependencies per component and the way the
dependencies are distributed across the system are
important. The literature provides instructions for both
to build DSMs and measure indirect dependencies [2].
Recent literature has successfully used DSM-based
metrics
to
comprehensively capture
system
dependencies [2][5][30]. Visibility matrix V derives
inbound and outbound dependency measures. Visibility
matrix also reveals indirect dependencies. DSMs for
direct dependencies are raised to successive powers, and
the results show the direct and indirect dependencies of
successive path lengths. These results are summed, and
all positive values are set to one. Visibility matrix can
be represented mathematically as follows:
V = ∑ 𝑀𝑛
in which M is the DSM of direct dependencies and n =
[0, f], where f is the longest path in the system. To
calculate V, one can use matrix multiplication or
algorithms like Warshall’s algorithm. From visibility
matrix, two metrics are derived. These describe both a
component’s potential dependencies and how these
dependencies relate to the overall system.
Visibility matrix produces row and column sums for
each component. We call these metrics of inbound
dependence (same as visibility fan-in) and outbound
dependence (same as visibility fan-out), respectively
[2], and leverage them in our theory development and
our illustrative example. A component’s inbound
dependence measure is the sum of all non-zero cells in
that component’s column in the visibility matrix. The
inbound dependence measure captures the components
whose changes might affect the focal component. A
component’s outbound dependence is the sum of all
non-zero cells in that component’s row of V. Outbound
dependence indicates the components that might be
affected by changes to the focal component.
4.3. Illustrative example: Turbo generator
We provide an example of a turbo generator to
illustrate inbound and outbound dependencies and the
application of our framework within a real-world
technological system. The example comes from an
engineer with wide knowledge of turbo generators. The
use of a single, explorative example seems appropriate
since it adds to our concrete understanding of
dependencies and system structures. Figure 3. shows the
components (nodes) of a turbo generator and all possible
direct and indirect dependencies (edges) among them.
Thus, Figure 3. visualizes visibility matrix, and the
edges form dependency paths that span the entire

system. These paths are like chains through which
changes to the system structure flow. Components like
the rotor, turbine stator 1, and turbine stator 2 can be
seen as sources of edges; these are located upstream, and
their outbound dependencies are high. Changing one of
these components may change the components to which
it points. For example, changing the rotor may change
turbine stator 1 and turbine stator 2, as well as the
components to which they point. By contrast,
components like the bed and frame are located
downstream; these have high levels of inbound
dependency, are “targets” or ending points of multiple
paths, and are likely to adapt to the changes in other
components. These extremes exist because of the
component hierarchy.
Figure 3. illustrates the component hierarchy by
highlighting these dependency paths. It also shows
where cyclic groups of the system are located. The end
ring, the core material (shaft), and the squirrel cage form
one cyclic group, while the rotor, stator 1, and stator 2
form another cyclic group. These two cyclic groups are
highly connected and are not equal in the component
hierarchy. The turbine rotor, stator 1, and stator 2 are
more likely to define the kind of end ring, core material
(shaft), and squirrel cage than vice versa. Changes in
these in-cycle components will cause changes elsewhere
in the system until all changes and iterations are
completed [5]. On the other hand, it is unlikely for a
component with low inbound and outbound dependency
to be a cyclic component. To clarify Figure 3., inbound
and outbound dependency values are provided in Figure
4. For clarity and legibility, Figure 4. does not list all
components.
Non-critical components in this system include the
feed water pump and the bearings shield. Their
outbound and inbound dependencies are quite low,
implying that neither buyer nor supplier is
technologically locked-in to the other. There are likely
several feed water pumps and bearing shields that could
easily be adjusted to this system, thus increasing the
availability of suppliers from the buyer’s perspective.
Leverage components in the turbo generator include
the frame and the bed. These components have high
inbound dependencies and, thus, require extensive
adaptation to system requirements. When the buyer
assembles the overall system, the supplier must follow
the buyer’s technological specifications for these parts,
resulting in buyer-specific investments for the supplier
and increasing the supplier’s dependence.
Buyer purchases of components like the rotor, stator
1, and stator 2 could create a supplier-dominated
situation. These components have high outbound
dependencies and low inbound dependencies. They
occupy high positions in the component hierarchy, so
other components adapt to them (not vice versa). Thus,
the supplier has no technological incentive to make
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18

Bed
Frame

16
14

Core material (shaft)
Pressure sensor
Flow sensor

Measurement
electronics

INBOUND

12

Squirrel cage
End ring
Heat exchanger

10
Flow transmitter
8
6

Terminal box

4
Bearings shield
Feed water pump

2

Generator converter
Electrical steel
laminations
Windings

Turbine rotor
Turbine stator-1
Turbine stator-2

0
0

5

10

OUTBOUND

15

20

25

Figure 3.-4. Inbound and outbound component dependencies.
compatibility changes for a certain buyer. Rather,
compatibility is the buyer’s responsibility, potentially
requiring buyer-side investments and increasing the
buyer’s dependence on the supplier. We argue that if a
buyer outsources bottleneck items, the supplier is likely
to have significant technological expertise in these
items.
When one is studying systems empirically, not all
system components will demonstrate all possible
purchasing categories. In this illustrative example,
purely strategic components with high outbound and
inbound dependencies do not exist; thus, no concrete
example of a strategic turbo generator component is
provided, and only examples of bottleneck, critical, and
leverage components are shown.

5. Discussion
In this conceptual paper we have developed a
framework that connects component’s technological
dependencies and its purchasing category. Component
dependencies at the system level are presented as
inbound and outbound dependencies. Technological
dependencies are connected to switching costs,
relationship-specific investments, and the need for
another party’s technological expertise. In turn, these
three factors show in which purchasing category
component belong to, according to literature. In this
paper the buyer is seen as the system owner and
integrator, who assemble the system entity. This paper
makes several contributions to the literatures on
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strategic purchasing. First, we propose metrics of
inbound and outbound dependence to assess switching
costs, investments, and the need for technological
expertise in buyer-supplier relationships. The most
important contribution is a theoretical framework in
which
technological
dependencies
determine
components’ purchasing categories. The division of
components into purchasing categories has historically
been problematic because theory provides no
prescriptions or procedures for accurate measurement.
Purchasing category dimensions rely on nebulous,
subjective concepts, such as supply risk or profit
impact, instead of operationalized measures [9] [10]
even if purchasing strategies are developed according to
categories. As implication of our theoretical
contribution, the way how components are divided to
purchasing categories can be done more objectively.
Technological dependencies form a continuum,
allowing the detection of locations between purchasing
categories. Technological dependencies are relatively
easy to measure; thus, our framework (unlike existing
subjective frameworks) can be validated and utilized by
researchers and practitioners alike. Our framework does
not propose that previous measures of supply risk and
profit impact are incorrect. We speculate that if a
leverage component with high inbound dependencies is
customized to a buyer, its profit impact could be higher
than that of a non-customized (non-critical) component.
If a buyer would adapt its system to a bottleneck
component with high outbound dependence, it cannot
easily switch suppliers, increasing perceived supply
risk. Strategic component (with high outbound and
inbound dependence) is adapting to other components
that are higher or same level in technical hierarchy
which may increase its profit impact. Simultaneously
there are other components that are lower in hierarchy
than strategic component, and those components must
adapt to strategic component which increases supply
risk. The buyer may perceive simultaneously high profit
impact and supply risk of strategic component.
The literature shows that the buyer firm can move a
component’s purchasing portfolio category [21]. Our
theoretical framework does not support category
changes in cases of identical architecture. The
technological dependencies remain in the system,
regardless of the buying firm’s actions. Thus, one could
question whether a buying firm can move its
components and suppliers to another purchasing
category simply by changing its strategy (and not its
system architecture); however, industry-wide standards
could enable such movements. The category movement
discussion could benefit from the inclusion of the
system architecture viewpoint.
Knowledge of technological dependencies is crucial
for managers, since these affect relationship
characteristics like switching costs, investments, needs

for technological expertise, and purchasing strategy
selection. As practical implication, our research
illustrates what kind of situations technological
dependencies create. Our theoretical framework could
bridge engineers and business managers, since
engineering decisions regarding system structure
interact with buyer-supplier relationship characteristics.
Though our theory takes the system’s technological
structure as a given, design choices should be made with
input from the purchasing perspective [18].
This research has its limitations. We assume that
buyers are the assemblers and integrators of systems
with (potentially) multiple suppliers. Otherwise, our
theoretical framework is not applicable. Outbound and
inbound dependence require a technological system
context; if system integration is not the buyer’s
responsibility, this falls to another supply chain actor. In
such a case, the buyer-supplier relationship is defined by
factors other than inbound and outbound dependence.
Second, if all system components have the same
inbound and outbound dependencies (e.g. in systems
with highly connected components; see [42]), our
operationalization does not apply. Third, we assume that
separate components have separate supplier
relationships. In reality, one supplier can provide
multiple parts, and relationships develop separately
from individual components. We preserve the
component-supplier linkage, since we do explore the
dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships not linked to
technology. Fourth, our theoretical framework does not
consider dominant industry designs or mass supplier
customizations. Dominant designs set industry
specifications and reduce compatibility issues, thus
changing the relationship dependence described in our
framework. Similarly, mass customization can change a
supplier’s dependence of a buyer by lowering the
manufacturing costs of customized components [24].
Our theoretical framework should be tested empirically
in future research (e.g. in the context of turbo
generators), and the impacts of dominant designs and
mass customization should be considered.

6. Conclusion
This paper has developed a theoretical framework to
explain how systems’ indirect and direct technological
dependencies (inbound and outbound dependence)
impact on buyers’ and suppliers’ switching costs,
investments, needs for technological expertise and,
ultimately, component purchasing categories. Previous
research has divided components into purchasing
categories without considering prevailing technological
dependency. We extend the strategic purchasing
literature by identifying how components’ technological
dependencies relate to their purchasing categories. We
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believe that these considerations of technological
dependencies are fruitful for purchasing research.
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